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Abstract. Content-Centric Networking (CCN) is an internetworking
paradigm that offers an alternative to today’s IP-based Internet Ar-
chitecture. Instead of focusing on hosts and their locations, CCN em-
phasizes addressable named content. By decoupling content from its lo-
cation, CCN allows opportunistic in-network content caching, thus en-
abling better network utilization, at least for scalable content distribu-
tion. However, in order to be considered seriously, CCN must support
basic security services, including content authenticity, integrity, confi-
dentiality, authorization and access control. Current approaches rely on
content producers to perform authorization and access control, which
is typically attained via public key encryption. This general approach
has several disadvantages. First, consumer privacy vis-a-vis producers is
not preserved. Second, identity management and access control impose
high computational overhead on producers. Also, unnecessary repeated
authentication and access control decisions must be made for each con-
tent request. (This burden is particularly relevant for resource-limited
producers, e.g., anemic IoT devices.)
These issues motivate our design of KRB-CCN – a complete authoriza-
tion and access control system for private CCN networks. Inspired by
Kerberos in IP-based networks, KRB-CCN involves distinct authentication
and authorization authorities. By doing so, KRB-CCN obviates the need for
producers to make consumer authentication and access control decisions.
KRB-CCN preserves consumer privacy since producers are unaware of con-
sumer identities. Producers are also not required to keep any hard state
and only need to perform two symmetric key operations to guarantee
that sensitive content is confidentially delivered only to authenticated
and authorized consumers. Furthermore, KRB-CCN works transparently
on the consumer side. Most importantly, unlike prior designs, KRB-CCN
leaves the network (i.e., CCN routers) out of any authorization, access
control or confidentiality issues. We describe KRB-CCN design and imple-
mentation, analyze its security, and report on its performance.
Note: This is the extended version of a manuscript published with the
same title at ACNS 2018 - Applied Cryptography & Network Security.
1 Introduction
Content-Centric Networking (CCN) is an emerging internetworking paradigm
that emphasizes transfer of named data (aka content) instead of host-to-host
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communication [1, 2]. All CCN content is uniquely named. Content producers
are entities that publish content under namespaces. Entities that wish to obtain
content, called consumers, do so by issuing an interest message specifying de-
sired content by its unique name. The network is responsible for forwarding the
interest, based on the content name, to the nearest copy of requested content.
Interests do not carry source or destination addresses. Each interest leaves state
in every router it traverses. This state is later used to forward, along the reverse
path, requested content back to the consumers. As content is forwarded to the
consumer, each router can choose to cache it. If a popular content is cached, sub-
sequent interests for it can be satisfied by the caching router and not forwarded
further. This can lead to lower delays, better throughput and improved network
utilization.
Due to CCN’s unique characteristics, security focus shifts from securing host-
to-host tunnels to securing the content itself. CCN mandates that each content
must be signed by its producer. This is the extent of CCN network-layer security.
In particular, CCN does not make any provisions for confidentiality, authoriza-
tion or access control, leaving these issues to individual applications. We believe
that this approach makes sense, since involving the network (i.e., routers) in
such issues is generally problematic for both performance and security reasons.
Access control (AC) in CCN has been explored in recent years. Most ap-
proaches [3–9] rely on using public key encryption to safeguard content (we
overview these approaches in Section 6). Specifically, producers are expected to
encrypt content with a public key corresponding to an authorized consumer,
or a group thereof. The latter use their corresponding private keys to decrypt.
Although it seems to work, this approach exhibits several problems:
– First, producers are responsible for handling consumer authentication and
content AC on their own. Thus, they must deal with (1) consumer identity
management and authentication, (2) AC policy representation and storage,
(3) updates of access rights, and (4) content encryption. In some cases, pro-
ducers might not want (or be able) to deal with this burden, e.g., resource-
constrained IoT devices. On the consumer side, this means keeping track of
producer-specific authentication contexts and keys.
– Second, AC enforced by producers implies sacrificing consumer privacy, which
is an important and appealing CCN feature. Since CCN interests do not carry
source addresses, a content producer (or a router) normally does not learn
the identity of the consumer. However, if the producer enforces AC, it learns
consumers identities.
– Third, if a set of producers belong to the same administrative domain and
each producer enforces its AC policy, it is difficult to react to policy changes,
e.g., access revocation for a given consumer or a consumer’s credential. Im-
plementing such changes requires notifying each producer individually.
– Finally, since public keys bind authorization rules to identities, authentica-
tion of consumers is attained via consumer-owned private keys. However, if
consumer is authenticated by other means, e.g., passwords and biometrics,
KRB-CCN: Lightweight Authentication & Access Control for Private CCNs 3
each producer would have to store and manage potentially sensitive state
information (password files or biometric templates) for each consumer.
Since mid-1980s, Kerberos [10] has been successfully and widely used to ad-
dress these exact issues in private IP-based networks or so-called stub Au-
tonomous Systems. Kerberos de-couples authentication and authorization ser-
vices via short-term tickets. It also allows services (e.g., storage, compute or web
servers) to be accessed by clients over a secure ephemeral session. By checking
a client’s ticket for freshness of authentication information, a service limits the
period of vulnerability due to revocation.
In this paper, we present KRB-CCN, a system inspired by Kerberos for authen-
tication and access control (AC) enforcement in CCN, that aims at addressing
the aforementioned issues 1. KRB-CCN treats consumer authentication and autho-
rization as separate services. It uses tickets to allow consumers to convey autho-
rization permissions to servers, e.g., content producers or repositories. Servers
use tickets to determine whether requested content should be provided. KRB-CCN
also introduces a novel namespace based AC policy, which allows a consumer to
securely retrieve content without revealing its identity to the content producer,
thus preserving consumer privacy. In addition, KRB-CCN is transparent to the
users; they need not be aware of KRB-CCN or perform any additional tasks. It
is also completely invisible to the network, i.e., CCN routers are unaware of
KRB-CCN.
Organization: Section 2 overviews CCN and Section 3 overviews Kerberos.
Next, Section 4 introduces KRB-CCN, including its system architecture, namespace
based AC scheme, and the protocol for authentication, authorization, and secure
content retrieval. In addition, a security analysis for the design presented in
Section 4 is provided in Appendix A. Then, performance of KRB-CCN is evaluated
in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 discusses related work and Section 7 concludes
this paper.
2 CCN Overview
We now overview key features of CCN. Given basic familiarity with CCN, this
section can be skipped with no loss of continuity.
In contrast to today’s IP-based Internet architecture which focuses on end-
points of communication (i.e., interfaces/hosts and their addresses) CCN [1,11]
centers on content by making it named, addressable, and routable within the
network. Moreover, a content must be signed by its producer. A content name
is a URI-like string composed of one or more variable-length name segments,
separated by the ‘/’ character. To obtain content, a user (consumer) issues
an explicit request message, called an interest containing the name of desired
content. This interest can be satisfied by either: (1) a router cache, or ( 2)
the content producer. A content object message is returned to the consumer
upon satisfaction of the interest. Name matching is exact, e.g., an interest for
1 KRB-CCN source-code is available at: https://github.com/ivanolive/krb-ccn
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/edu/uni-X/ics/cs/fileA can only be satisfied by a content object named
/edu/uni-X/ics/cs/fileA.
In addition to a payload, a content object includes several other fields. In
this paper, we are only interested in the following three: Name, Validation, and
ExpiryTime. Validation is a composite of validation algorithm information
(e.g., the signature algorithm, its parameters, and the name of the public verifi-
cation key), and validation payload, i.e., the content signature. We use the term
“signature” to refer to the entire Validation field. ExpiryTime is an optional,
producer-recommended duration for caching a content object. Interest messages
carry a name, optional payload, and other fields that restrict the content object
response. We refer to [11] for a complete description of all CCN message types,
fields and their semantics.
Packets are moved within the network by routers. Each CCN router has two
mandatory (and one optional) components:
– Forwarding Interest Base (FIB) – a table of name prefixes and corresponding
outgoing interfaces. The FIB is used to route interests based on longest-
prefix-matching (LPM) of their names.
– Pending Interest Table (PIT) – a table of outstanding (pending) interests
and a set of corresponding incoming interfaces.
– An optional Content Store (CS) used for content caching. The timeout for
cached content is specified in the ExpiryTime field of the content header.
From here on, we use the terms CS and cache interchangeably.
A router uses its FIB to forward interests toward the producer of requested
content. Whereas, a router uses its PIT to forward content along the reverse
path towards consumers. Specifically, upon receiving an interest, a router R first
checks its cache (if present) to see if it can satisfy this interest locally. In case of
a cache miss, R checks its PIT for an outstanding version of the same interest. If
there is a PIT match, the new interest’s incoming interface is added to the PIT
entry. Otherwise, R creates a new PIT entry and forwards the interest to the
next hop according to its FIB (if possible). For each forwarded interest, R stores
some state information in the PIT entry, including the name in the interest and
the interface from which it arrived, such that content may be returned to the
consumer. When content is returned, R forwards it to all interfaces listed in the
matching PIT entry and then removes the entry. A content that does not match
any PIT entry is discarded.
3 Kerberos Overview
We now summarize Kerberos. We refer to [12] for a more extensive descrip-
tion. Kerberos includes four types of entities: clients, services, an Authentication
Server (AS), and a Ticket-Granting Server (TGS). The AS/TGS pair (which are
often collocated within the same host) is also known as a Key Distribution Cen-
ter (KDC). Should a new client/user or a new service be added to the network,
it must first be properly registered into KDC’s (AS and TGS) databases.
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In Kerberos’ terminology, a realm corresponds to a single administrative
domain, e.g., a private network or a stub Autonomous System. Each realm has
one KDC and any authorization or AC decision by a KDC is only valid within its
realm. Thus, identities, tickets, and encryption keys (see below) are also realm-
specific.
Principal is the term used to refer to names of entries in the KDC database.
Each user/client and service has an associated principal. User principals are gen-
erally their usernames in the system. Service principals are used to specify vari-
ous applications. A service principal has the format: service/hostname@realm.
A service specification is needed in addition to a hostname, since a single host
often runs multiple services. With Kerberos operation in IP Networks, principals
are resolved to host IP addresses via DNS look-ups [13]. As can be expected,
CCN obviates the need for DNS look-ups, since all content objects are uniquely
named by design. Moreover, routing is done based on content names. As dis-
cussed below, KRB-CCN enforces AC based on content namespaces, instead of
service principals.
Each client/user principal (i.e., username) stored in the AS database is asso-
ciated with a key, which can be either a public-key or a symmetric key derived
from the user’s password. Also, the same client/user principal also exists in the
TGS database. However, it is associated with a list principals for services that
such user has permission to access.
Before attempting to access any content, a client must first authenticate to
its local AS. This is done by either typing a password, or proving possession
of a secret key associated with the client’s identity in the AS database. If the
client proves its identity, AS issues a Ticket-Granting Ticket (TGT) – a
temporary proof of identity required for the authorization. This TGT might be
cached and used multiple times until its expires.
The client uses a valid TGT to request, from TGS, authorization for a ser-
vice. The TGS is responsible for access control decisions – verifying whether
the requested service is within the set of permitted services for the identity as-
certained in the provided TGT. If the result is positive, TGS issues a Service
Ticket (ST) to be used for requesting the actual service.
4 KRB-CCN Design
There are three fundamental requirements for any authentication and autho-
rization system. First, AC policies must effectively bind identities to their access
rights. Second, once AC policies are established, there must be a way to enforce
them, thus preventing unauthorized access. Third, authentication mechanisms
must ensure that identities can not be spoofed; this includes both producers
and consumers. The system must also not involve the network elements (i.e.,
routers) where authentication and authorization burden is both misplaced and
simply unnecessary.
In the rest of this section, we describe how KRB-CCN achieves each of these
requirements. We start by introducing KRB-CCN system architecture and its
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namespace-based AC policy, which takes advantage of CCN hierarchical con-
tent name structure to provide AC based on content prefixes. Next, we describe
KRB-CCN communication protocol, which enforces AC policies while providing a
single sign-on mechanism for user authentication. Though KRB-CCN is inspired
by Kerberos for IP-based networks, it also takes advantage of unique CCN fea-
tures to effectively satisfy basic authentication and authorization requirements.
Throughout the protocol description we discuss the intuition behind the security
of KRB-CCN. A detailed security analysis of KRB-CCN is provided in Appendix A.
As it is the case for IP-based Kerberos, KRB-CCN targets private (content-
centric) networks, such as intra-corporation/intra-Autonomous Systems settings.
Fig. 1. KRB-CCN system architecture
4.1 System Architecture
Recall that Kerberos has 4 types of entities: AS, TGS, client, and server. A
Kerberos realm (domain) typically has one AS/TGS pair, usually collocated in
the same host, as well as multiple clients and servers. KRB-CCN also includes four
types of entities that map to Kerberos entities as follows:
– Consumer: corresponds to Kerberos client. It issues interests for content and
services according to KRB-CCN protocol. Each consumer has an identity and
a set of associated permissions registered in the system.
– Producer: subsumes one or more Kerberos servers. A producer is required
to register its namespace(s) in the system, by registering with a TGS (see
below). A single namespace, i.e., a name prefix, can correspond to a single
Kerberos server. Alternatively, a group of namespaces of the same producer
can be treated as a single server. A producer does not perform any direct
consumer authentication or authorization. A producer only checks whether
a content-requesting consumer possesses a valid TGS-issued ticket.
– As in Kerberos, authentication and authorization are handled by two logi-
cally separated entities which can be collocated:
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Authentication Server (AS) (aka TGT-Prod): treated as a special type of
producer that generates so-called Ticket-Granting Tickets (TGT-s) for con-
sumers once their identities are verified. These tickets can then be used as
temporary proofs of identity. We refer to the AS as TGT-Prod.
Ticket-Granting Server (TGS) (aka CGT-Prod): performs authorization and
is also treated as a special type of producer. Based on a valid consumer TGT
and a request to access to a given namespace (server), TGS checks whether
this consumer is allowed access to the requested namespace. If so, TGS issues
a Content-Granting Ticket (CGT), which proves to the producer that this
consumer is granted access to any content under the requested namespace.
We refer to TGS as CGT-Prod.
Figure 1 illustrates KRB-CCN system architecture. As part of the log-in proce-
dure (aka single sign-on or SSO), a consumer authenticates to TGT-Prod (round
1) and obtains a TGT, which it caches. Whenever a consumer wants to ini-
tially access content from a particular producer, it requests authorization from
CGT-Prod using its cached TGT (round 2) and obtains a CGT, which it also
caches. A CGT authorizes access to one or more namespaces belonging to the
same producer. Finally, a consumer requests content from the producer using
the corresponding CGT (round 3). TGT and CGT-s remain valid and re-usable
until their expiration time runs out. Note that each round (1, 2 and 3) is realized
as a single interest-content exchange.
Subsequent requests from the namespace(s) specified in the CGT require
no involvement of either TGT-Prod or CGT-Prod. A consumer retrieves another
content by directly issuing an interest containing the cached CGT. To access
content under a different namespace, a consumer uses its cached TGT to contact
CGT-Prod and request a new CGT.
For authentication and authorization, KRB-CCN must ensure that TGT-s and
CGT-s issued to a specific consumer Cr are unforgeable, and not usable by clients
other than Cr. Moreover, it must make sure that content authorized for Cr can
only be decrypted by Cr. In the rest of this section we go into the details of how
KRB-CCN achieves these requirements and functionalities.
4.2 Namespace-Based AC Policies
Instead of traditional service principals in Kerberos, KRB-CCN AC policies refer
to namespaces, i.e, prefixes of content names that correspond to a producer.
Recall that a content name is a URI-like string composed of arbitrary number
of elastic name segments, separated by a ‘/’ character. For example, consider
a content named:
/edu/uni-X/ics/cs/students/alice/images/img1.png
The leftmost part, /edu/uni-X/ics/cs, defines this content’s original pro-
ducer’s location. Subsequent name segments get increasingly specific, defining,
e.g., location of the content in a directory structure on the producer.
KRB-CCN leverages this hierarchical name structure to implement AC poli-
cies based on content prefixes. For example, to grant Alice permission to re-
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trieve contents under the prefix /edu/uni-X/ics/cs/students/alice, names-
pace /edu/uni-X/ics/cs/students/alice/* must be included under Alice‘s
ID in the AC Policy Store, as shown in Figure 1. This entry would allow Alice
to retrieve /edu/uni-X/ics/cs/students/alice/images/img1.png, as well as
any content with that same prefix.
Suppose that Bob is a faculty member of the faculty in the same institution
and has privileges to retrieve contents under own (Bob’s) private directory and
any content of students’ directories. Bob’s entry in the AC Policy store would
include two namespaces:
/edu/uni-X/ics/cs/faculty/bob/* and /edu/uni-X/ics/cs/students/*
The former allows Bob to access its own private directory under the faculty
directory, but no other faculty’s private directories. The latter allows Bob to
access contents of any student directory under /edu/uni-X/ics/cs/students/
*. Finally, suppose that Carl is a system administrator. As such, he has access
to all content. Carl’s entry in the AC Policy Store would be the namespace
/edu/uni-X/ics/*, allowing access to any content with a name starting with
this prefix; this includes all faculty and students’ content.
If Alice (who is not yet ”logged in”, i.e., has no current TGT) wants to
issue an interest for /edu/uni-X/ics/cs/students/alice/images/img1.png
she first authenticates to TGT-Prod to get a TGT. Alice then uses the TGT to
request a CGT from CGT-Prod for namespace /edu/uni-X/ics/cs/students/
alice/*. Notice that Alice does not need to specify the actual content name
– only the namespace. Therefore, CGT-Prod does not learn which content Alice
wants to retrieve, only the producer’s name. Since CGT is associated with /edu/
uni-X/ics/cs/students/alice/*, it can be used for future interests within the
same namespace, e.g., /edu/uni-X/ics/cs/students/alice/docs/paper.pdf.
4.3 Protocol
To retrieve protected content, Cr must go through all of KRB-CCN’s three phases,
in sequence: authentication, authorization, and content retrieval. As discuss be-
low, transition between phases is automated on the consumer side, i.e., it requires
no extra actions. Table 1 summarizes our notation.
Authentication:
The first phase on KRB-CCN verifies consumer identity via authentication. The
authentication protocol in Figure 2 is executed between Cr and TGT-Prod. If it
succeeds, Cr receives a TGT, used in the authorization phase, as proof that Cr’s
identity has been recently verified.
Cr starts by issuing an interest with TGT suffix in the content name (e.g.,
/uni-X/ics/TGT). This interest carries as payload consumer’s UID, i.e, Cr’s
username. Hence, the actual interest name also contains a hash of the payload as
its suffix 2. The interest is routed by CCN towards TGT-Prod. Upon the interest,
2 In CCN design, an interest carrying a payload must have the hash of the payload
appended to its name.
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Table 1. Notation summary
Notation Description
N A namespace prefix (e.g., edu/uni-X/ics/alice/)
Cr Consumer
TGT Name Ticket-granting ticket name (e.g., edu/uni-X/ics/TGT) that will
be routed towards TGT-Prod
CGT Name Content-granting ticket name (e.g., edu/uni-X/ics/CGT) that
will be routed towards CGT-Prod
skC Consumer Secret Key
pkC Consumer Public Key, including public UID and certificate
kA Long-term symmetric key shared between TGT-Prod and
CGT-Prod
kP Long-term symmetric key shared between CGT-Prod and a given
Content Producer
s←$ {0, 1}λ Random λ-bits number generation
ct← Enck(pt) Authenticated Encryption of pt using symmetric key k
pt← Deck(ct) Decryption of ct using symmetric key k
ct← Encpk(pt) Authenticated encryption of pt using public key pk
pt← Decsk(ct) Decryption of ct using secret key sk
TGT-Prod looks up UID in its user database and retrieves the corresponding
public key. The protocol assumes that, when a user enrolls in the system, a
public/private key-pair is generated. Alternatively, a password can be used for
the same purpose, as discussed later. Once TGT-Prod successfully locates the
user and retrieves the public-key, it proceeds with TGT generation. Otherwise,
it replies with a special error content message indicating unknown user.
TGT is an encrypted structure with three fields: UID, kCGT , and expiration
date t1. It is encrypted using kA – a long-term symmetric key shared between
TGT-Prod and CGT-Prod. Only CGT-Prod can decrypt and access cleartext fields
of a TGT. Since Cr needs to present the TGT to CGT-Prod during the autho-
rization phase, UID binds the TGT to Cr. This same UID is used later for
namespace access rights verification. CGT-Prod uses t1 to verify whether a TGT
is still valid. TGT expiration time is a realm-specific (and usually realm-wide)
parameter reflecting the duration of a typical user authenticated session, e.g.,
8 hours. After TGT expires, Cr needs to repeat the authentication protocol
with TGT-Prod. A TGT also contains a short-term symmetric key kCGT , en-
crypted separately for CGT-Prod and Cr. The purpose of kCGT is to allow Cr
and CGT-Prod to communicate securely in the subsequent authorization protocol
phase. In addition to the TGT, TGT-Prod generates tokenCCGT , which contains
the same t1 and kCGT encrypted with the pkC associated with UID.
To transmit the TGT to Cr, TGT-Prod responds with a content message con-
taining the TGT and tokenCCGT , which is routed by CCN back to Cr. Cr cannot
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decrypt, access, or modify the TGT due to the use of authenticated encryption.
Cr decrypts token
C
CGT and caches the TGT for the duration of t1, along with
kCGT . The TGT is presented to CGT-Prod every time Cr needs to request au-
thorization for a new namespace.
Consumer TGT-Prod
I.name = TGT Name
payload=UID−−−−−−−−−→
pkC ← fetch(UID)
t1 ← setTGTExpiration()
kCGT ←$ {0, 1}λ
tokenCCGT ← EncpkC (kCGT ||t1)
TGT← EnckA(UID||t1||kCGT )
payload=TGT,tokenCCGT←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
kCGT ||t1 ← DecskC (tokenCCGT )
store(TGT, t1, kCGT)
Fig. 2. Consumer authentication protocol
Consumer CGT-Prod
I.name = CGT Name
payload=N,TGT−−−−−−−−−−→
UID||t1||kCGT ← DeckA(TGT )
Verify: t1 not expired
kP ← verifyPolicyAndFetchKey(N,UID)
kN ←$ {0, 1}λ
t2 ← setCGTExpiration()
CGT← EnckP (N ||kN ||t2)
tokenCN ← EnckCGT (kN ||t2)
payload=CGT,tokenCN←−−−−−−−−−−−−−
kN ||t2 ← DeckCGT (tokenCN )
store(N,CGT, t2, kN)
Fig. 3. Consumer-data authorization protocol
Authorization:
The authorization phase (Figure 3) is executed between Cr and CGT-Prod. It
requires Cr to have a valid TGT, acquired from the authentication phase de-
scribed above. Upon successful completion of the authorization protocol, Cr
obtains a namespace-specific CGT, which demonstrates Cr’s authorization to
access a particular restricted content namespace. However, the CGT does not
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reveal Cr’s identity to the content producer; Cr’s authorization is ascertained
based on possession of a correct session key.
Cr starts the protocol by sending an interest with name set to CGT Name.
The payload includes the namespace prefixN (e.g., /edu/uni-X/ics/cs/students/
alice/*) for which authorization is being requested and a non-expired TGT.
Optionally, if confidentiality for namespace N is an issue, Cr can compute
EnckCGT (N). instead of sending N in clear. When CGT-Prod receives this in-
terest, it uses kA (long-term symmetric key shared by TGT-Prod and CGT-Prod)
to decrypt the TGT and obtains UID, t1 and kCGT . Next, CGT-Prod checks
TGT for expiration. It then optionally (if encryption was used in the interest)
computes N ← DeckCGT (EnckCGT (N)).
If the TGT is successfully verified, CGT-Prod invokes verifyPolicyAndFetchKey
procedure, which (1) fetches AC rules for user UID; (2) verifies if N is an au-
thorized prefix for UID; and (3) returns kP – symmetric key associated with
the producer for N . kP is later used to encrypt the CGT such that only the
appropriate producer can decrypt it.
Similar to a TGT, a CGT carries an expiration t2 and a fresh key kN . The
latter is used between Cr and the content producer for confidentiality and mutual
authentication, as discussed later. However, instead of UID, a CGT includes
N , i.e., a CGT proves to the content producer that whoever possesses kN is
authorized to access content under N . Also, a tokenCN ← EnckCGT (kN ||t2) is
sent to Cr, such that Cr can obtain kN and t2.
In response to a CGT interest, Cr receives a content packet containing the
CGT and tokenCN . Cr decrypts token
C
N using KCGT and creates a cache entry
containing: N , the CGT, kN , and t2. This cached information is used (until time
t2) in all future requests for content under N .
Authorized Content Request:
On the consumer (client) side, a KRB-CCN content request is similar to a regular
CCN interest, except that Cr needs to include a valid CGT in the payload. An
authorized interest name has the format: N ||suffix (e.g., /edu/uni-X/ics/cs/
students/alice/images/img1.png), where N is authorized by the CGT, and
suffix specifies which content is being requested under namespace N . Note
that, as long as Cr has proper access rights, a single CGT allows accessing any
content with prefix N .
The secure content retrieval phase is in Figure 4. When the producer receives
an interest for a restricted content, it first decrypts the CGT and verifies its ex-
piration. Note that kP used to decrypt the CGT is shared between the producer
and CGT-Prod. Thus, successful decryption (recall that we use authenticated en-
cryption) implies that CGT was indeed generated by CGT-Prod and has not been
modified. The producer obtains kN , which is also known to Cr. The producer
encrypts requested content using kN , i.e., D
′ ← EnckN (D). D′ is returned to
Cr, which decrypts it to obtain D.
Note that, by replaying the interest issued by Cr, anyone can retrieve D
′.
This might not appear problematic since only the authorized consumer (who
12 Nunes and Tsudik
has kN ) can decrypt D
′. However, in some application scenarios this might be
troublesome, e.g.:
– Production of content requires a lot of computation, e.g., expensive encryp-
tion. In this case, an adversary can replay legitimate interests previously
issued by authorized consumers. The adversary’s goal might be to mount a
DoS attack on the producer.
– The producer might be a peripheral device, e.g., a printer. In this setting,
the interest might be a request to print a (perhaps very large) document
and returned content D might be a mere confirmation of it having been
printed. In this case, the replay attack allows the adversary to print the
same document multiple times, resulting in DoS.
This issue occurs since the producer does not authenticate Cr for each interest.
A modified version of the protocol, shown in Figure 5, addresses the problem. It
uses a challenge-response protocol that allows the producer to confirm that Cr
possesses kN before producing the content or providing service. As a down-side,
this incurs an additional round of communication for the challenge-response pro-
tocol.
Consumer Content Producer
I.name = N||suffix
payload=CGT−−−−−−−−−→
N ′||kN ||t2 ← DeckP (CGT )
Verify N ′ is prefix of I.name
Verify t2 expiration
D ← ProduceData(I.name)
D′ ← EnckN (D)
payload=D′←−−−−−−−−
D ← DecKN (D′)
Fig. 4. Content retrieval without op-
tional challenge-response based con-
sumer authentication
Consumer Content Producer
I.name = N||suffix
payload=c1,CGT−−−−−−−−−−−→
N ′||kN ||t2 ← DeckP (CGT )
Verify N ′ is prefix of I.name
Verify t2 expiration
n1 ←$ {0, 1}λ
chall← EnckN (n1)
payload=chall←−−−−−−−−−
n1 ← DecKN (chall)
reply ← EnckN (n1 + 1)
payload=reply−−−−−−−−−→
n′1 ← DecKN (reply)
Verify: (n′1 − 1) = n1
D ← ProduceData(I.name)
D′ ← EnckN (D)
payload=D′←−−−−−−−−
D ← DecKN (D′)
Fig. 5. Content retrieval including
optional challenge-response based con-
sumer authentication
Transparent Execution & Ticket Caching:
Recall that Cr must issue three types of interests, for: authentication, autho-
rization, and the actual content request. This process is transparent to the user
since KRB-CCN consumer-/client-side code handles these steps by following the
work-flow in Figure 6.
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Whenever Cr issues an interest, KRB-CCN client intervenes and checks whether
the name is part of any restricted namespace. If so, it looks up the local cache
of CGT-s to find a CGT for prefix N . If a valid CGT is found, it is added to
the interest payload and the interest is issued. A cached and valid CGT can be
used to skip the first two phases, allowing authenticated and authorized content
retrieval in one round.
If no valid cached CGT is found, KRB-CCN client looks up a cached TGT. If
a valid TGT is found, the authentication phase is skipped. The client requests a
CGT and uses it to request the actual content. This process takes two rounds.
In the worst case all three phases are executed, which results in three rounds
of communication. Since consumers only request TGT and/or CGT-s when these
tickets expire, ticket caching also reduces the number of requests (and overall
traffic volume) flowing to TGT-Prod and CGT-Prod. In practice, we expect CGT-
s and TGT-s to be long-lived, i.e., on the order of hours or days, similar to
current single sign-on systems. This means that the bulk of authorized content
retrieval can be performed in one round. If mutual authentication (per protocol
in Figure 5) is demanded by the producer, one extra round is required.
Fig. 6. KRB-CCN work-flow for transparent execution on consumers
5 Implementation & Performance Evaluation
This section discusses our KRB-CCN prototype implementation and its perfor-
mance.
5.1 Methodology
KRB-CCN is implemented as an application service running as specific purpose
producers that produce tickets. Also, consumer-side code is modified to imple-
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ment the work-flow for authenticated and authorized content request in Figure 6.
Our implementation uses the CCNx software stack [14] and the cryptographic
library Sodium [15]. Both publicly available and written in C. For authenticated
PKE operations, we use Sodium Sealed-Boxes [16], implemented over X25519
elliptic curves. AES256-GCM [17] is used to encrypt-then-MAC, i.e., for authen-
ticated symmetric-key encryption.
Experiments presented in this section were ran on an Intel Core i7-3770 octa-
core CPU @3.40GHz, with 16GB of RAM, running Linux (Ubuntu 14.04LTS).
Content payload sizes for interests were set to 10 kilobytes. Payload sizes of
TGT and CGT contents are 228 bytes and 165 bytes, respectively. Each carries
the respective ticket/token pair, as described in Section 4. In every experiment,
each participating entity’s process was assigned as a high priority, and each ran
in a single processor core. Unless stated otherwise, results are an average of 10
executions, presented with 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 7 presents our network testbed. The goal is to evaluate KRB-CCN’s
overhead. To avoid topology-specific delays, we used a minimal setup containing
a single producer P , TGT-Prod, and CGT-Prod. These entities are interconnected
by an unmodified CCNx Athena router.
5.2 Experiments
We start by measuring per-request processing times at each producer: TGT-Prod,
CGT-Prod, and P . Each of these processes was executed 1, 000 times. Figure 8
presents the distribution, as box-plots, of processing time for verifying an incom-
ing interest and replying with the content (either ticket, or authorized encrypted
content) at each producer type. Figure 8 shows that the most computationally
expensive part is TGT issuance (about 500µ s per request). Higher computa-
tional overhead for TGT issuance makes sense because the authentication token
(tokenCCGT in Figure 2) is encrypted with Cr’s public key. In case of password-
based authentication, public key encryption is replaced by much faster symmetric
key encryption using a password-derived key. This incurs much lower computa-
tional overhead on TGT-Prod.
Times for CGT issuance and content production are around 200µ s and
300µ s, respectively. Time is naturally higher for the latter, since encrypted data
is larger. In case of content production, the whole content (10kB) is encrypted.
In a CGT request, only the CGT and the token need to be encrypted, resulting
in a faster processing time.
To investigate how KRB-CCN entities cope under increasing congestion, we
flood them with a massive number of simultaneous interests: from 300 to 3000.
We then measure average Round-Trip Time (RTT) per type of issued interest.
Figure 9 shows the RTTs for each response type. We also include the RTT for
regular CCN content retrieval. Since it incurs no extra processing overhead, the
regular content RTT is the lower bound for RTTs in CCNx implementation.
The average RTT for interests for TGT, CGT, and authorized encrypted
content are similar. The latter is slightly higher as more data (10kB per interest)
must traverse the reverse path back to the consumer. KRB-CCN requests incur
KRB-CCN: Lightweight Authentication & Access Control for Private CCNs 15
Fig. 7. Experimental testbed
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under different ticket caching policies
in average ∼ 60% higher RTT than unmodified content retrieval. In the largest
scale test case, with 3000 simultaneous interests issued for each producer, content
replies are received in less than 800ms.
Finally, we also measure the overall throughput perceived by the consumer
in three possible scenarios:
– Cached TGT and CGT: in this case the consumer requests contents un-
der the same namespace. Therefore, the same (non-expired) cached CGT
can be used for authorized content retrieval, allowing the client to skip the
authentication and authorization phases.
– Cached TGT only: this is the case in which no AC ticket caching hap-
pens. It happens when the consumer always requests contents under differ-
ent namespaces or because the realm owner demands consumers to request
a fresh CGT for each content. In this case only the authentication part of
the protocol is skipped at each request.
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– No caching: This is the case in which the realm owner does not allow single
sign-on through TGT caching nor authorization reuse through CGT caching.
Three requests (authentication, authorization, and content retrieval) are re-
quired for each content packet.
Recall that issuance of appropriate interests in each of the cases is automat-
ically handled by KRB-CCN client software running on the consumer.
For each of the above cases, we gradually increase the rate of interests re-
quested per second until throughput reaches its asymptotic limit. By analyzing
throughput results, presented in Figure 10, we can observe the benefit of ticket
caching. When both TGT and CGT caching are enabled, the client perceived
throughput is higher than in the other cases, as actual content can be retrieved
with a single interest. Conversely, caching only TGT-s is still better than not
caching any type of ticket, because in this case the authentication phase can be
skipped.
6 Related Work
Previous related efforts provide other types of security services currently avail-
able in IP-based networks. ANDaNA [18] is an anonymity service analogous to
Tor [19] that uses CCN application-layer onion routing. Mosko, et al. [20] pro-
posed a TLS-like key exchange protocol for building secure sessions for ephemeral
end-to-end security in CCN. Similar to IPSec-based VPNs [21], CCVPN [22] is a
network-layer approach for providing content confidentiality and interest name
privacy via secure tunnels between physically separated private networks.
There are several CCN-based techniques that implement so-called Content-
Based Access Control (CBAC). They tend to rely on content encryption under
appropriate consumer keys to enforce AC. A group-based AC scheme for early
versions of CCN was proposed in [3]. Policies tie groups of consumers to con-
tent, ensuring that only consumers belonging to authorized groups can decrypt
restricted content. Similarly, Misra et al. [4] proposed an AC scheme based on
broadcast encryption [23,24]. Wood et al. [5] proposed several AC schemes based
on proxy re-encryption [25,26] to enable consumer personalized content caching.
An attribute-based AC system, using attribute-based cryptography [27, 28] was
proposed in [6]. CCN-AC [7] is a framework that unifies CBAC-type methods by
providing a flexible encryption-based AC framework. It relies on manifest-based
content retrieval specification (defined in CCNx 1.0 [29]) to enable flexible and
extensible AC policy specification and enforcement. A similar approach is pro-
posed in NDN-NBAC [8] framework. In these frameworks, data owners generate
and distribute private keys to consumers via out-of-band channels. Producers
receive corresponding public keys also via out-of-band channels. These public
keys are used to encrypt one-time (per-content) symmetric keys.
In a different vein, Ghali et al. [9] proposed an Interest-Based Access Con-
trol (IBAC) scheme, wherein access to protected content is enforced by making
names secret and unpredictable – based on encryption with keys known only
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to authorized consumers. Compared with CBAC, IBAC has the advantage of
preserving interest name privacy and allowing content caching. However, IBAC
must be used in conjunction with CBAC to preclude unauthorized content re-
trieval via replay of previously issued obfuscated interest names.
In all schemes discussed above, authentication, authorization/AC, and con-
fidentiality are often convoluted. In particular, producers are assumed to be
implicitly responsible for authentication and authorization. This implies deal-
ing with identity management and thus violating consumer privacy. Moreover,
authentication and AC are enforced on a per-content basis which is unscalable
and expensive. To the best of our knowledge KRB-CCN is the first comprehensive
approach to address these issues by (1) separating authentication, authoriza-
tion and content production among distinct entities; and (2) issuing re-usable
authentication and authorization tickets for restricted namespaces.
7 Conclusions
We presented KRB-CCN – a comprehensive design for handling authentication,
authorization, and access control in private CCN networks, while preserving
consumer privacy. KRB-CCN is transparent to consumers and incurs fairly low
overhead. We analyzed KRB-CCN security and assessed its performance based
on a prototype implementation. Experimental results show that KRB-CCN is a
practical and efficient means of providing multiple security services in private
(stub AS) CCNs.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Christopher Wood for fruitful discussions and
feedback. This work was supported by CISCO University Research Award (2017).
References
1. V. Jacobson, D. K. Smetters, J. D. Thornton, M. F. Plass, N. H. Briggs, and R. L.
Braynard, “Networking named content,” in Proceedings of the 5th international
conference on Emerging networking experiments and technologies. ACM, 2009,
pp. 1–12.
2. L. Zhang, D. Estrin, J. Burke, V. Jacobson, J. D. Thornton, D. K. Smetters,
B. Zhang, G. Tsudik, D. Massey, C. Papadopoulos et al., “Named data networking
(ndn) project,” Relato´rio Te´cnico NDN-0001, Xerox Palo Alto Research Center-
PARC, 2010.
3. D. K. Smetters, P. Golle, and J. Thornton, “Ccnx access control specifications,”
PARC, Tech. Rep, Tech. Rep., 2010.
4. S. Misra, R. Tourani, and N. E. Majd, “Secure content delivery in information-
centric networks: Design, implementation, and analyses,” in Proceedings of the 3rd
ACM SIGCOMM Workshop on Information-centric Networking. ACM, 2013, pp.
73–78.
18 Nunes and Tsudik
5. C. A. Wood and E. Uzun, “Flexible end-to-end content security in ccn,” in Con-
sumer Communications and Networking Conference (CCNC), 2014 IEEE 11th.
IEEE, 2014, pp. 858–865.
6. M. Ion, J. Zhang, and E. M. Schooler, “Toward content-centric privacy in icn:
Attribute-based encryption and routing,” in Proceedings of the 3rd ACM SIG-
COMM workshop on Information-centric networking. ACM, 2013, pp. 39–40.
7. J. Kuriharay, E. Uzun, and C. A. Wood, “An encryption-based access control
framework for content-centric networking,” in IFIP Networking Conference (IFIP
Networking), 2015. IEEE, 2015, pp. 1–9.
8. Y. Yu, A. Afanasyev, and L. Zhang, “Name-based access control,” Named Data
Networking Project, Technical Report NDN-0034, 2015.
9. C. Ghali, M. A. Schlosberg, G. Tsudik, and C. A. Wood, “Interest-based access
control for content centric networks,” in Proceedings of the 2nd International Con-
ference on Information-Centric Networking. ACM, 2015, pp. 147–156.
10. B. C. Neuman and T. Ts’o, “Kerberos: An authentication service for computer
networks,” IEEE Communications magazine, vol. 32, no. 9, pp. 33–38, 1994.
11. M. Mosko, I. Solis, and C. Wood, “CCNx semantics,” IRTF Draft, Palo Alto Re-
search Center, Inc, 2016.
12. F. Ricciardi, “Kerberos protocol tutorial,” The National Institute of Nuclear
Physics Computing and Network Services, LECCE, Italy, 2007.
13. P. V. Mockapetris, “Domain names-concepts and facilities,” 1987.
14. PARC, “Ccnx distillery,” https://github.com/parc/CCNx Distillery, 2016.
15. Sodium, “The sodium crypto library (libsodium),” https://github.com/jedisct1/
libsodium, 2017.
16. D. J. Bernstein, “Curve25519: new diffie-hellman speed records,” in International
Workshop on Public Key Cryptography. Springer, 2006, pp. 207–228.
17. M. Dworkin, Recommendation for block cipher modes of operation: Galois/Counter
Mode (GCM) and GMAC. US Department of Commerce, National Institute of
Standards and Technology, 2007.
18. S. DiBenedetto, P. Gasti, G. Tsudik, and E. Uzun, “Andana: Anonymous named
data networking application,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1112.2205, 2011.
19. R. Dingledine, N. Mathewson, and P. Syverson, “Tor: The second-generation onion
router,” Naval Research Lab Washington DC, Tech. Rep., 2004.
20. M. Mosko, E. Uzun, and C. A. Wood, “Mobile sessions in content-centric net-
works,” in IFIP Networking, 2017.
21. N. Doraswamy and D. Harkins, IPSec: the new security standard for the Internet,
intranets, and virtual private networks. Prentice Hall Professional, 2003.
22. I. O. Nunes, G. Tsudik, and C. A. Wood, “Namespace tunnels in content-centric
networks,” in 2017 IEEE 42nd Conference on Local Computer Networks (LCN).
IEEE, 2017, pp. 35–42.
23. A. Fiat and M. Naor, “Broadcast encryption,” in Annual International Cryptology
Conference. Springer, 1993, pp. 480–491.
24. D. Boneh, C. Gentry, and B. Waters, “Collusion resistant broadcast encryption
with short ciphertexts and private keys,” in Crypto, vol. 3621. Springer, 2005,
pp. 258–275.
25. G. Ateniese, K. Fu, M. Green, and S. Hohenberger, “Improved proxy re-encryption
schemes with applications to secure distributed storage,” ACM Transactions on
Information and System Security (TISSEC), vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 1–30, 2006.
26. R. Canetti and S. Hohenberger, “Chosen-ciphertext secure proxy re-encryption,”
in Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications se-
curity. ACM, 2007, pp. 185–194.
KRB-CCN: Lightweight Authentication & Access Control for Private CCNs 19
27. V. Goyal, O. Pandey, A. Sahai, and B. Waters, “Attribute-based encryption for
fine-grained access control of encrypted data,” in Proceedings of the 13th ACM
conference on Computer and communications security. Acm, 2006, pp. 89–98.
28. J. Bethencourt, A. Sahai, and B. Waters, “Ciphertext-policy attribute-based en-
cryption,” in Security and Privacy, 2007. SP’07. IEEE Symposium on. IEEE,
2007, pp. 321–334.
29. I. Solis and G. Scott, “Ccn 1.0 (tutorial),” ACM ICN, 2014.
20 Nunes and Tsudik
Appendix A: KRB-CCN Security Analysis
We now discuss security of KRB-CCN design presented in Section 4. We start by
introducing the assumed adversary model and then split security analysis into 3
parts: user authentication, authorization, and content.
7.1 Adversary Model
We consider the worst-case scenario: Cr, that does not have a valid CGT or TGT,
wants to fetch certain content. Thus, Cr must engage in KRB-CCN authentication
(Figure 2), authorization (Figure 3), and authorized content retrieval (Figure 4
or 5, depending on the producers’ requirements). TGT-Prod and CGT-Prod are
trusted parties.
Adversary Goals and Capabilities: The adversary succeeds if it: (1)
retrieves and decrypts unauthorized content; (2) retrieves any session key (kCGT ,
kN ) or long-term key (kA, kP ); or (3) forges tickets (TGT or CGT), tokens, or
contents, leading Cr to believe that such forgeries were generated by honest
parties; We consider a generic adversary Adv that is ubiquitous within a given
KRB-CCN realm. Adv can perform the following actions:
– Compromise and deploy compromised routers: We allow Adv to com-
promise any number of existing CCN routers on the path between communi-
cation end-points. Hence, Adv learns all information in the routers and can
change it at will. This includes changing FIB, PITs and content caches. We
also allow Adv to deploy its own compromised routers.
– Eavesdrop, analyze, and replay messages: Adv can observe all CCN
messages. Moreover, Adv can record and replay any traffic at will.
– Issue interests and publish content: Adv can deploy its own malicious
consumers and producers. Thus, Adv can issue arbitrary interests and pro-
duce arbitrary content under its owned namespace.
Note: Protecting software and hardware of consumers or producers is out of
scope for KRB-CCN. In particular, hardware and software exploits or malware
are not considered in our analysis. Similar to IP-based Kerberos, KRB-CCN is an
authentication and authorization system for secure computing platforms com-
municating over an untrusted (CCN) network.
We analyze KRB-CCN security in a top-down fashion. Security of content de-
pends on security of the authorization phase, which, in turn, relies on secure user
authentication. Therefore, we start by arguing that content retrieval is secure
as long as authorization is secure. Then, we show that authorization is secure
if user authentication is secure. Finally, we argue security of authentication by
showing that only the owner of a certain user identity can gain access to content
by claiming such identity. These notions are formalized bellow.
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7.2 Content Retrieval Security
Content retrieval security means guaranteeing Property 1 (below) in case of con-
tent retrieval without consumer authentication. When consumer authentication
is required, secure content retrieval implies both Properties 1 and 2.
Property 1 Given an interest containing a CGT in the format
CGT ← EnckP (N ||kN ||t2) as its payload, assuming that kN is only known by
Cr and kP is only known by producer Pr, it must hold that:
1. Pr only replies to valid (non-expired and authentic) CGT-s issued by CGT-Prod
and only Pr can decrypt such CGT-s;
2. A valid CGT for N can not be used to retrieve contents that do not belong
to namespace N ;
3. Only Cr can decrypt content generated by Pr in response to an interest con-
taining such CGT;
4. Cr can check content authenticity (i.e., whether content originated at Pr)
and integrity.
Claim 1 KRB-CCN content retrieval protocol (Figure 4) retains Property 1.
Proof (sketch) 1 Item (1) is assured because only CGT-Prod knows kP and au-
thenticated encryption with kP is used to encrypt CGT. Moreover, the expiration
t2 is checked before issuing content replies. Item (2) follows from the integrity of
received CGT (guaranteed by item 1) and the fact that Pr checks if the received
request is for content that has the prefix N . Item (3) is true because content
replies are encrypted under kN , which is only known by Cr. Item (4) is assured
by the use of authenticated encryption using kN . Only Pr has kN , because kN is
transmitted inside CGT, which is encrypted with kP . Therefore, Cr can be sure
that such content was in fact generated by Pr and also verify the received content
integrity.
Property 2 Given an interest containing a CGT in the format
CGT ← EnckP (N ||kN ||t2) as its payload, if kN is only known by consumer Cr
and kP is only known by producer Pr, only Cr is able to use such CGT to get
Pr to execute D ← ProduceData(I.name).
Claim 2 KRB-CCN content retrieval protocol with consumer authentication (Fig-
ure 5) retains Properties 1 and 2.
Proof (sketch) 2 The proof that content retrieval protocol with consumer au-
thentication has Property 1 is equivalent to Proof 1. Property 2 is achieved be-
cause, in the protocol in Figure 5, Pr also plays a challenge response protocol with
Cr, guaranteeing that Cr knows KN before executing D ← ProduceData(I.name).
Both properties assume that KP is only known to CGT-Prod and Pr. This
key is shared between them when Pr enrolls into a KRB-CCN realm. The prop-
erties also assume that KN is only known to consumer Cr, which follows from
authorization security, discussed in Section 7.3.
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7.3 Authorization Security
Authorization security is represented by Property 3.
Property 3 Given an authorization request interest for namespace N with
TGT ← EnckA(UID||t1||kCGT ) as payload, assuming that kCGT is only known
by consumer Cr and kA is shared between CGT-Prod and TGT-Prod, it must hold
that:
1. CGT-Prod will only reply to valid (non-expired and authentic) TGT-s issued
by TGT-Prod and only CGT-Prod is able to decrypt such TGT-s;
2. A CGT is only issued if the UID in the TGT has access to namespace N ;
3. Only Cr is able to retrieve and verify integrity and authenticity of kN ;
Claim 3 KRB-CCN authorization protocol (Figure 3) retains Property 3.
Proof (sketch) 3 Item (1) follows from the use of authenticated encryption
with kA to encrypt the TGT and from the expiration verification of t1. Recall
that kA is only shared between CGT-Prod and TGT-Prod. Item (2) is guaranteed
by the integrity of received TGT (item (1)) and by the verification in the AC
Policy database performed by CGT-Prod. Item (3) holds because kN is encrypted
with kCGT , generating token
C
N (and kCGT is only known by Cr). Therefore, only
Cr can decrypt token
C
N and obtain kN . Integrity of kN is verifiable by Cr due to
the use of authenticated encryption to generate tokenCN .
Property 3 ensures that CGT-s are only issued to authorized consumers be-
cause only those are able to use kCGT to decrypt token
C
N and retrieve kN . The
only missing link in KRB-CCN security is to ensure that if a given Cr has kCGT
such Cr is in fact the owner of UID identity in the TGT. This is discussed next,
in Section 7.4.
7.4 Authentication Security
Authentication security relies on making sure that only the owner of a claimed
UID is able to retrieve kCGT , i.e., the key included in the TGT issued for UID.
This is stated by the following property:
Property 4 Given an identity represented by (UID, skC , pkC), where pkC is a
public-key know to TGT-Prod and skC is the associated secret-key only know to Cr
– the owner of UID. It must hold that , for an issued TGT← EnckA(UID||t1||kCGT ),
only Cr is able to retrieve the key kCGT . Moreover Cr can verify integrity and
authenticity of kCGT .
Claim 4 KRB-CCN authentication protocol (Figure 2) retains Property 4.
Proof (sketch) 4 Since tokenCCGT is encrypted using pkC , only the owner of
UID can decrypt it and recover kCGT . Integrity and authenticity of kCGT are
verifiable due to the use of authenticated encryption.
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In the password-based version of KRB-CCN, instead of encrypting under a
public key, TGT-Prod would generate tokenCCGT by encrypting with a symmetric
key derived from password. Presumably, only the user that owns UID would
know that secret password and be able to generate the same key to decrypt
tokenCCGT . This approach shares the same characteristics and challenges (e.g.,
password strength, dictionary attacks, password memorability) of any password-
based authentication. Password-based authentication is an option in KRB-CCN
design. However, discussing specific challenges of password based authentication,
though interesting, is not in the scope of the present work.
7.5 Discussion
By retaining Properties 1, 2, 3, and 4, KRB-CCN ensures secure authentication,
AC, content integrity, and content confidentiality. As KRB-CCN protocol runs on
consumers and producers, compromised routers and/or eavesdroppers are not
able to violate what is guaranteed by the aforementioned properties.
Replay attacks and spoofed messages do not allow Adv to retrieve (unen-
crypted) content. If the content production is heavyweight, DoS via replay can
be ruled out by enforcing mandatory mutual authentication (protocol in Fig-
ure 5).
In addition to the security services discussed in this section, KRB-CCN pre-
serves consumer privacy. Producers only need to verify CGT-s authenticity and
integrity, instead of consumers’ identities. CGT-s do not carry UIDs, but instead
associated keys, allowing the system to remain secure while preserving privacy.
CGT-s are issued for namespaces (and not for complete content names). Thus,
not even CGT-Prod (which knows the consumer UID) is able to predict which
content will be requested by a consumer after issuing a CGT.
With ticket (TGT and CGT) caching, authentication and authorization can
be skipped for subsequent interest within the same namespace. Therefore, most
of the times KRB-CCN only requires low-cost (symmetric key) cryptographic op-
erations from consumers/producers.
